The recent intervention in Libya may have had far reaching effects in combating future human rights violations against civilian populations. Indeed, with little headway gained in stopping President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdowns in Syria, civilians of this Middle Eastern nation can vouch for Libya’s role in transforming how the international community approaches human rights infractions.
The New Year has brought about little change in Syria. Imposed sanctions by the Arab League and Western states have failed in their initial goals of crippling President Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s ability to carry out violent crackdowns on its own civilians. The Syrian crisis has been further complicated with the advent of military deserters in whom President Assad claims to have been responsible for the recent violence within the Middle Eastern state. As such, al-Assad continues to blame crackdowns on these “terrorist cells.” Further accusations have also been directed towards Western states, claiming the West responsible for Syria’s current destabilization. The Arab League is also not spared in Assad’s rhetorical salvoes. Assad has emphasized that the League is now nothing more than a regional pawn of Western interests.
Assad’s crosshairs come in response to the Arab League’s observer mission that concluded that the Syrian crisis was a “humanitarian disaster.” And while the UN quoted another 400 dead since the observer mission began, multilateral mandated action remains off the table.
International paralysis
Syria’s principal undoing may have been the intervention that lead to the liberation of colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. Without Benghazi in rebel hands, intervention by Western forces may not have played out as it did. Syria’s rebellion is in its early stages, concentrating on protest rather than a full-blown military challenge to Assad’s government. Ironically, Libyan precedent dictates that further bloodshed may be the Syrian population’s only hope for international intervention. Without a rebel stronghold in Syria, the rebels are unable to claim belligerency status under international law. As a result, mandated action seems unlikely to occur.
The Libyan intervention further informs the international paralysis in the United Nations Security Council concerning Syria. This is exemplified by the Russian and Chinese Veto of UN sanctions on Syria, and the abstention by Brazil, India and South Africa. Thanks to the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Libyan intervention, BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia, India, South Africa) nations see Syria as another scenario in which Western states realized interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention. Western assets in Libya were substantial, ranging from oil and gas deals to arms contracts. Libya was the ideal case of interests lining up with circumstance for the West, an illusion easy for BRICS nations to see through.
As a result, NATO actions in Libya have made multilateral actions mandated by the UN less likely to occur. More importantly, it could be argued that the Libyan intervention has further undermined the United Nations as a forum for international peace. Unfortunately, this bodes ill for Syria, as the Syrian population appears to be the chessboard on which larger, more powerful nations are jockeying and counterweighing one another.
It is unclear whether or not we are witnessing the BRICS nations emerging as a powerful counterweight to the Western Bloc. However, as BRICS nations are generally in favor of non-intervention, the ability for the world to respond to legitimate large-scale humanitarian infractions could be affected. In a sense, Libya was a botch, not a success. Or rather, perhaps it could be viewed as too successful. In any regard, there are winners and losers, and Syria appears to be the first of the latter.
Responsibility to protect?
The Syrian crisis begs a further question: what exactly is the role of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) after Libya? Or rather, how has Libya potentially redefined R2P? R2P was a released report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established after the failure of states to intervene during the Rwandan genocide. R2P became the legal response to the slogan “Never Again.” Yet R2P became a delicate piece of international legality. Even before the Libyan intervention, certain states have accused the UN to be selective in R2P’s implementation, while others have gone so far as to declare it a contemporary form of imperialism.
In Libya, R2P was questioned as Western means of obtaining a UN mandated no-fly zone, in which Western states were able to realize long held interests in the North African state. With this precedent set in Libya, it was easy for BRICS nations to oppose any resolution pertaining to Syrian intervention.
Syria has become evidence of R2P’s breakdown. UN estimates have placed the civilian death toll in Syria at 5,000 since crackdowns began last March. Still, very little has been done. International paralysis concerning Syria has left bilateral actions as the only measure in counterweighing the endemic violence against civilians in Syria. As a result, economic sanctions have become the primary utensil of Western states.
Economic sanctions: a self-defeating formula
As Syria’s struggle increasingly resembles a civil war, action is being called for the world over. But action taken for the sake of action is not only imprudent, but also unethical considering the consequences. Economic sanctions have become redundant and relatively ineffectual in curbing human rights violations. Sanctions, according to international legal theorist Joy Gordon have the tendency to squeeze the bottom strata’s of society. Economic sanctions trickle down and affect the poorest people in sanctioned nations, usually those who are expressing their dissatisfaction with the current regime. It is only when the screams are loud enough to be heard, does policy slowly begin to alter.
Economic sanctions are a relatively primitive form of coercion in search of policy or regime change. Thanks to the non-discriminatory nature of sanctions, affecting particular demographics is difficult. As a result, sanctions target the people and not their governments. It is unlikely that sanctions from the Arab League, Turkey, and several Western states will achieve their desired effects of halting the violence in Syria. In fact, recent reports confirming further civilian casualties have confirmed this hypothesis.
Dire straits
In view of the evolution and trajectory of al-Assad’s brutality towards his own people, it seems as though intervention is the only means of helping Syria’s civilian population. Sanctions have been unable to achieve their set goals of stopping crackdowns. The Arab League’s suspension of Damascus and its observer mission to Syria were a failure in posturing a hard stand against al-Assad. Western and Arab states have their hands tied, having exhausted all other avenues regarding the human rights infractions by al-Assad in Syria. It is in this context that Libya becomes Syria’s afterthought, doomed to its own fate.
The only viable intervention measures on the table were back in November 2011, when Mohammad Riad Shakfa, Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, declared that opposition forces in Syria would welcome Turkish intervention. Turkey was seen as neutral state in the Middle East, holding strong ties with Europe while not a hostage of its interests. Unfortunate for Syria, Turkish intervention was unable to occur thanks to rising Kurdish activity stirring on its southern borders. Instead, the Turkish government joined the position of imposing economic sanctions.
Of further consequence to the Syrian civilian population may be the shift of Western attention to Iran. With the Iranian government in a standoff against the United States, Syria’s prospects for a stable future are in dire straits. Indeed, the world’s preoccupation with Iran may allow the Syrian situation to permeate and, perhaps, even grow worse. With the future of R2P in question and internationally mandated intervention unlikely to occur, the Syrian tragedy appears to be on an extended collision course with no foreseeable end in sight.
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